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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL COMPENSATION AND SOCIAL LOAFING: THE EFFECTS OF INCENTIVE, 
TRUST LEVEL, GENDER, AND COWORKER PERFORMANCE
Bems, Steven Francis
University of Dayton, 1994
Advisor: Charles E. Kimble, Ph.D.
Previous research (Harkins and Szymanski, 1988, 1989) has shown
that work group members tend to loaf when their contributions are 
not identifiable or when a group has no objective standard. Other 
research (Williams and Karau, 1991) suggests that expectations 
about co-worker performance affect how people perform in groups: 
for instance, people who report lower trust levels have displayed 
a tendency to compensate for other work group members. The 
present study included factors associated with social loafing and 
some of those associated with social compensation. The study also 
included multiple trials, so the experimenter was provided with a 
way to determine if people will repeatedly compensate. It was 
found that teamed low trusters displayed significantly more 
improvement than teamed high trusters over the course of trials. 
High trusters performed better as individuals than as team 
members, especially when an incentive was provided. It was also 
found that females did not perform the same as males: Males 
tended to compensate for their partners, regardless of trustiii
level, while only low trust females attempted to compensate. High 
trust females who worked in teams failed to perform as well as 
they did in practice, so they essentially loafed. These and other 
findings are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
People are often called upon to participate in group activities 
because the output of a single individual does not always satisfy task 
demands. Group members often supply expert knowledge or abilities 
which are unique, therefore groups can usually achieve much more than 
isolated individuals. Since the 1880s, social psychologists have been 
attempting to identify factors which might moderate the amount of 
effort being supplied by group members. In a classic rope-pulling 
study, Ringlemann (1913), it was found that people tend to work harder 
on individual tasks than on collective tasks. A secondary source, 
Kravitz and Martin (1986), explains that those subjects who thought 
that their efforts were being pooled with a group's did not pull as 
hard. This phenomenon, originally referred to as the Ringlemann 
Effect, is now termed social loafing. The new terminology is much 
more descriptive, for it asserts that group members do not always work 
to their full potential when they are working with others.
Social loafing has been observed when individual contributions to a 
group product cannot be identified. Williams, Harkins, and Latane 
(1981) found that when people were asked to cheer, those who were 
wearing earphones which allowed them to hear only other people (and1
2not themselves) had a tendency to exert less effort. The above 
researchers suggest that social loafing can actually be eliminated
when individual contributions are identifiable. The research of
Harkins and Jackson (1985) suggests that the ability to identify
individual contributions is one of two factors which mediate social
loafing. Harkins and Jackson state that group members also require an 
objective standard so that they themselves can evaluate their group’s 
performance. Harkins and Jackson found that participants were not 
quite as industrious at generating a list of uses for an object when 
others were working with different objects, despite the fact that both 
group and individual outputs were identified. Participants apparently 
felt that their list could not be compared to others. Further support 
is provided by Harkins and Szymanski (1989) in which participants 
perform a variety of tasks under a wide variety of conditions (group- 
standard, individual-standard, group-no standard, and individual-no 
standard). Those working in the group-standard condition did as well 
as those in the individual conditions while those participating in a 
group without a standard tended to loaf. One question which arises 
from this area of research has to do with whether or not people would 
work as hard at a task when they are told that some unspecified 
performance standard exists and that they have either succeeded or 
failed in achieving that standard.
Brickner, Ostrom, and Harkins (1986) indicates that personal 
involvement also has an impact on one’s tendency to engage in social 
loafing. In the above study, the experimental task (involving thought
3
generation) was manipulated so that participants were either asked to 
comment on a proposal which would affect them greatly (a senior 
competency exam for the next year) or one which would not affect them 
(an exam for another school or one proposed six years in the future). 
Significantly more responses were produced when the proposal had 
personal meaning. Personal meaning was equated with intrinsic 
importance or with an outcome of significant consequence.
Jackson and Williams (1985) indicates that social loafing is more 
likely when a collective task (a task which is accomplished by working 
with and depending upon others) is simple. The above researchers 
found that people solve a simple maze best when working in the mere 
presence of others (better than when working alone or collectively), 
but tend to perform the poorest when attempting to solve a difficult 
maze in the presence of others. The mere presence of others appeared 
to increase drive which, in turn, increased the likelihood of a 
dominant response (a correct answer on a simple problem or an 
incorrect answer on a difficult problem). The ability to work with 
others apparently allows one to relax, for one can depend upon others 
for aid: Less drive would exist when one is working alone or as part 
of a team, therefore the dominant response is less likely. Given the 
above, one would be more likely to select an incorrect response to a 
difficult problem when working in the mere presence of others, but 
less likely to select an incorrect response when working on a simple 
problem in the presence of others. The conclusion one might draw from 
the above is that one should attempt a difficult task by working alone
4or as part of a team.
Perhaps at the heart of those situations in which social loafing 
occurs is what is termed a social dilemma by Orbell and Dawes (1981). 
Another term for the same situation would be the public/collective 
goods problem (Platt, 1973). Regardless of terminology, one is faced 
with the decision of whether or not to expend personal resources such 
as effort to aid in the pursuit of a group goal or product. While it 
might be in one's best interest to remain idle and let someone else do 
the work or take risks for the sake of the entire group, people will 
often cooperate in achieving the task at hand. Social psychologists 
are currently examining when and why group members do not expend the 
same amount of effort as they do when working alone or in the mere 
presence of others. There are numerous situations in which people 
must consider whether or not to engage in social loafing. In each 
case, people must decide whether or not personal efforts are in some 
way dispensable to completion of the group's task. Some people 
obviously loaf when the answer to this question is affirmative.
Platt (1973) suggests that a social trap is more likely to be overcome 
when there is a short term negative consequence to selfish behavior 
which does not aid the group or when there is a short term positive 
consequence to behavior which does aid the group.
Kerr (1983) indicates that social loafing is more likely when group 
members recognize that others are not contributing their share of the 
work. In the above study, people appeared to become less motivated to 
pump air through a "flowmeter" not only when their capable partner
5consistently succeeded, but also when their able partner consistently 
failed. A reduction in effort was not induced when one's partner was 
incapable or when participants were working in the presence of someone 
else. Kerr (1983) essentially provided an opportunity to observe 
social loafing along with what he describes as the "sucker effect". 
Participants in the above study became less motivated (and failed to 
perform as well) when they were teamed with a fictitious capable 
partner who either consistently succeeded or who consistently failed. 
Participants evidently decided that their efforts were dispensable 
when a capable partner succeeded. When, on the other hand, capable 
partners consistently failed, some participants evidently tried to 
avoid being stuck with all of the work (the sucker role) by failing as 
well. Kerr has suggested that people try to avoid playing the sucker 
role because they simply wish to avoid being taken advantage of. The 
sucker role is uncomfortable because the other person is violating 
several social norms: When one person does all of the work, the 
equity norm is violated, for their level of contribution does not gain 
them a higher level of reward. The norm of social responsibility is 
also violated, for everyone within a group is expected to reciprocate. 
An incapable partner would not actually be violating these norms, so 
Kerr's hypothesis appears to be quite viable.
One specific situation in which group members will work harder at a 
collective task is one in which students are required to produce a 
group paper or group presentation. Williams and Karau (1991) suggests 
that some people will engage in behavior which they describe as social
6compensation because they believe that other group members are either 
less competent or tend to rely upon them to do most of the work. The 
most extreme forms of social compensation would supposedly occur when 
a group member does not trust others and places a high value on the 
group/team product. In the classroom situation, students who do not 
place great trust in others would compensate most if they need a good 
grade and expect to make some difference by working harder. It would 
appear that the hypotheses produced by Williams and Karau (1991) are 
consistent with expectancy-value models (Vroom, 1964) to the extent 
that they would not expect to observe social compensation if people 
feel incapable of changing the situation or if people do not value the 
group product.
Williams and Karau suggest that while it was not recognized, social 
compensation may have actually occurred within Kerr (1983), the study 
previously described. Participants in Kerr’s study were asked to work 
alone, with a capable partner who succeeded, or with a capable partner 
who consistently failed. A rather unique aspect of Kerr's methodology 
is that the experimenter can examine how participants perform after 
they have received feedback about how well they and their partner did. 
Participants who were teamed with a loafing partner succeeded on seven 
of nine trials (75.4% of the time) as opposed to eight of nine trials 
(88.9% of the time) in the individual condition. Williams and Karau 
further suggest that had the reward for success been greater within 
Kerr's experiment, those working with a loafing partner may have
succeeded even more often. The reward for success in Kerr's was 25
7cents. While Kerr stresses that participants who were teamed with a 
loafer performed significantly poorer than individual participants 
(they let the team fail so that they would not appear to be suckers), 
it is Williams and Karau's contention that participants who had been 
teamed with a loafing partner actually engaged in social compensation 
(their teams succeeded on 75.4% of the trials even though one person 
was doing all of the work). Williams and Karau further suggest that 
team participants might have succeeded even more often (more often 
than individuals) had they been presented with the appropriate level 
of reward. Criticism such as the above is further supported by 
Brickner, Ostrom and Harkins (1986); this study addresses the effect 
of task importance/meaningfulness (as previously noted): Well- 
rewarded behavior appeared to have been allotted greater effort than
that which received little reward.
Based upon the above assumptions, Williams and Karau (1991) 
conducted a series of three experiments: In their first experiment, 
participants who were previously categorized as being low, medium, or 
high trusters (according to the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale;
Rotter, 1967) were asked to generate a list of uses for an object
within either a coactive or collective work condition. Participants
worked in the mere presence of another when assigned to the coactive
condition. Those assigned to the collective condition actually worked 
with and depended upon the other person. The above authors found a 
significant main effect of trust (medium trusters were less productive 
than both low and high trusters) along with a significant trust X work
9decision making would seem to be required. One way to achieve this 
effect would be to use a form of reinforcement which is contingent 
upon the participants level of performance (more like the average work 
environment). It was decided that the bonus system used in some 
workplaces would be replicated in such a way that the less successful 
would stand less chance of receiving a prize. The effect of incentive 
could also be examined if participants are assigned to different 
bonus/incentive conditions.
8condition interaction (those who placed less trust in their coworkers 
were more productive on collective tasks than on coactive tasks).
The second experiment involved a manipulation of coworker effort (a 
confederate stated that they planned to work very hard or not so hard) 
and the task was described as being rather meaningful (the brainstorm­
ing task was described as a metric for intelligence testing, thus 
participants would desire to perform well). The principal finding in 
experiment two was that participants seemed to compensate for someone 
who did not plan to work hard (those teamed with a low effort partner 
did as well as those who worked alone and better than those working 
with a high effort co-worker). Experiment three involved the same 
work condition manipulation along with a manipulation of co-worker 
ability (able, not able) and a manipulation of task meaningfulness 
(the study was portrayed to be of either great importance to the 
experimenter or of little importance). Coactive participants tended 
to do better than team participants at low task meaningfulness, at 
both levels of co-worker ability, and at high co-worker effort. Team 
participants did work harder when they perceived that their partner 
was not able, however, so social compensation occurred as expected.
Despite the criticisms which have been leveled against Kerr (1983), 
there would appear to be an advantage to using Kerr's multiple trial 
sequence, for it allows one to examine any motivational losses or 
gains which might result from the various experimental conditions. It 
has been specifically suggested that there was a problem with Kerr's 
use of reward, so a reward which has greater impact upon one's
CHAPTER II
THE EXPERIMENT
The purpose of the present study is to examine how trust level 
(high and low), work condition (individual and team), and incentive 
(incentive, no incentive) affect one’s performance on a word 
recognition task. The best way to examine how the above variables 
interact would theoretically be through a fusion of the Williams and 
Karau (1991) study and the Kerr (1983) study. It was predicted that
there would be a Trust X Incentive X Work Condition interaction such
that high trusters working for no incentive in the collective work 
condition would perform the poorest while low trusters working for an 
incentive within the collective condition would perform the best. 
Other predictions were that the presence of an incentive would 
affect high trusters more than low trusters (a Trust by Incentive 
interaction) and that low trusters would be more productive in the 
collective/team condition (a Trust by Work Condition interaction as 
in Williams and Karau, 1991).
A main effect of work condition was expected, for the task would 
not involve difficult forms of information processing and simple 
tasks tend to be performed better in coactive environments (Jackson 
and Williams, 1985).
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Despite the fact that performance standards were not specified 
and only general feedback was provided, a main effect of incentive was 
expected, for Brickner, Ostrom, and Harkins (1986) indicates that 
important tasks receive greater amounts of effort.
Lastly, a main effect of trust was expected, for Williams and 
Karau (1991) indicates that high trusters (and medium trusters) 
tend to be less productive in general (presumably due to their 
tendency to loaf during instances when low trusters might try to 
compensate).
Method
Design
The design was a 2(male v. female) by 2(individual v. team) by 
2 (incentive v. no incentive) by 2 (high trust level v. low trust 
level) by 3 (trial 1 v. trial 2 v. trial 3) mixed factorial with a 
total of 80 participants either passively or randomly assigned to each 
of the resulting cells. Practice performance was treated as a 
covariate measure. Participants were students who were taking part 
in experimentation in order to obtain course credit for a first year 
level psychology course.
Procedure
After being shown to individual lab rooms, participants were 
asked to respond to a ’’survey” described as being unrelated to the 
experiment for which they had volunteered. The survey was actually 
a computerized version of Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale. When
12
participants completed the Rotter Scale, the computer would thank 
them by participant number (this number was actually their score on 
the trust scale). Participants were classified as high or low 
trusters based upon whether they were above or below the sample mean 
for each gender. Equal numbers from each gender were then randomly 
assigned to a work condition and incentive level. At this point, all 
participants were asked to fill out an informed consent form which 
basically stated that they would be working on a word recognition task 
either alone or with a partner. All were then asked to practice the 
experimental word recognition task. The task involved finding a pre­
specified four-letter word which was hidden within a 34 by 36 field of 
scrambled letters. The target word appeared within each page 55 
times. In order to prevent participants from keeping track of how 
many locations they had already found, participants were asked to 
switch pages at every one minute time interval over the course of each 
five minute trial. Participants were asked to circle locations on a 
transparent sheet protector so that scoring might proceed faster and 
paper could be conserved. A computerized timer program caused a 
single beep to sound whenever participants were required to switch 
pages. A double beep signaled the end of each trial. After the 
practice trial, participants were told that the experimenter would 
take some time to examine how well they did. After about five 
minutes, the experimenter came back and stated that the new objective 
would be to exceed one’s practice performance. Those who were 
participating as part of a team were told that their scores would be
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added to the other person’s and that their team had to circle more 
locations than they did in practice in order to succeed. The 
experimenter then explained that a poor individual performance would 
not hurt the team as long as the other person was able to make up for 
the difference. Those participating within the incentive condition 
were provided with a stack of 24 poker chips and told that if they/ 
their team succeeded on each trial, they would retain all of their 
poker chips, otherwise a number of chips would be withdrawn (this 
number depending upon the extent of their failure). Each poker chip 
was described as a separate entry in a future $20 drawing.
Following the conclusion of the first performance trial (in which 
participants circled a new four-letter target word) and a sufficient 
amount of time to examine how well participants did, the experimenter 
presented some contrived feedback: Individuals were told that they 
had circled 10% more locations than they had found in the practice 
trial. Team participants were told that their team had done a little 
over 2% better, for they had found 10% more locations while their 
partners had found 5% fewer. Feedback was contrived in such a 
way in order to retain control and to make team participants believe 
that a capable partner was loafing. The stack of poker chips 
presented to those in the incentive condition then remained untouched.
After a second performance trial in which a new four-letter word 
was presented, all participants were again presented with contrived 
feedback: Individuals were told that they had located 5% fewer unique 
locations than in practice. Team participants were told that their
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team had done a little over 7% worse, for they had circled 5% fewer 
locations and their partner had circled 10% fewer. The consequence of 
’’failure” in the incentive condition was the loss of 8 poker chips.
The third performance trial proceeded in the same fashion, but was 
followed immediately by a questionnaire which served as a manipulation 
check. Participants were specifically asked if they could recall the 
outcome of preceding trials and a section of mood level items was used 
to determine whether or not the experimental factors had any effect 
upon mood (the scale consisted of 11 items such as ’’happy", ’’ashamed", 
and "angry"; see Appendix A). After participants had completed the 
questionnaire, the experimenter sought to detect suspicion about the 
true nature of the study by asking additional questions such as "Do 
you feel that this was a good way to measure the effect of time 
pressure?", "Were you surprised by any of the performance feedback?", 
and "Do you feel that your partner performed as you expected?". A 
debriefing followed in which participants were allowed to read about 
the reasons for the study, the approval process, and how they might 
learn more about the subject if interested (see Appendix B for the 
debriefing form).
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Mixed factorial analyses of covariance were applied to the data.
The dependent variable in this study was the number of unique 
locations circled on five identical forms during the course of each 
trial. The only within-subjects variable was trial. Four trials were 
involved in the study, so a new four letter word was used in each.
The order in which these four words were used was randomized. The
dependent measure was considered to be very sensitive to any motiv­
ation losses or gains because word recognition is a rather well- 
practiced skill. Practice effects were predicted to be minimal for 
the same reason. Practice trial performance was treated as a 
covariate measure to compensate for any pre-existing individual
differences. See Table la and lb for the entire set of cell means.
One primary concern during examination of the data was whether or
not there would be an interaction between work condition and trust
level, for it was predicted that low trusters working within teams
would perform the best while high trusters working within teams would
perform the poorest. The results proved to be much more complex than
originally expected, because gender interacted with trust level and
work condition in such a way that the above prediction was only true
for females. Analysis revealed a Gender X Work Condition X Trust 
15
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Table la
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of Trust, 
Gender, Incentive and Trial at the Individual Level
High Male Inc
Practice
36.8
Trial 1 
39.0
Trial 2 
38.6
Trial 3 
42.8
Row Mean* 
40.1
High Male Noinc 29.4 30.6 32.2 35.0 32.6
High Fem Inc 38.6 43.2 43.8 43.6 43.5
High Fem Noinc 37.0 43.2 39.4 41.6 41.4
Low Male Inc 36.6 41.2 42.8 45.0 43.0
Low Male Noinc 30.4 33.0 37.2 35.6 35.3
Low Fem Inc 39.0 39.4 38.4 39.4 39.1
Low Fem Noinc 35.2 40.6 43.0 39.8 41.2
Column Mean 35.4 38.8 39.4 40.4
* Practice trial performance was used as a covariate measure; 
therefore, practice scores were not included in the Row Means.
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Table lb
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of Trust, 
Gender, Incentive and Trial at the Team Level
High Male Inc
Practice
35.8
Trial 1 
37.4
Trial 2 
39.6
Trial 3 
42.8
Row Mean*
39.9
High Male Noinc 36.0 42.0 43.3 47.2 44.1
High Fern Inc 36.6 35.6 36.0 39.6 37.0
High Fern Noinc 39.2 38.8 40.0 38.6 39.2
Low Male Inc 33.6 37.8 40.0 40.8 39.6
Low Male NoInc 32.0 36.6 39.6 39.8 38.7
Low Fern Inc 33.8 41.2 46.2 40.2 42.6
Low Fern Noinc 30.2 40.4 41.2 40.6 40.7
Column Mean 34.7 38.7 40.7 41.2
* Practice trial performance was used as a covariate measure; 
therefore, practice scores were not included in the Row Means.
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Level interaction, F(1,63)=9.32, p<.01, which occurred because the 
simple interaction effects of Trust Level and Work Condition were 
not the same for each gender. See Figures la and lb.
Further analysis revealed that the Trust Level X Work Condition 
interaction was significant for females, F(l,31)=10.27, p<.01, but 
not for males. Figure lb shows that while high trust females scored 
high in the individual condition, they did not score as high in the 
team condition. There is also indication that males did not perform 
as predicted since the interaction was not significant for males as
well.
Still further analysis revealed a significant simple effect of 
Trust Level for females participating in teams, F(l,15)=20.30, pc.OOl. 
It would appear that the low trust females performed better than the 
high trust females within the team condition.
The above simple interaction was also the source of a significant 
simple effect of Work Condition for high trust females, F(l,15)=7.17, 
p<.05. The high trust females basically performed better in the 
individual condition. The above provides partial support for the 
prediction that high trust participants would perform best within the
individual condition.
While it was predicted that incentive would interact with trust 
level and work condition such that the best performers would be 
low trusters working for an incentive within teams and the poorest 
performers would be high trusters working without an incentive within 
teams, the Trust Level X Work Condition X Incentive interaction was
19
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Figure la
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of Trust, 
Gender and Work Condition (Male Data Only)
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LowTL
High TL
Figure lb
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of Trust, 
Gender and Work Condition (Female Data Only)
21
not significant.
It was also predicted that there would be an interaction between 
trust level and incentive, for it was theorized that high trusters 
would be more heavily influenced by an incentive, particularly at 
the team level (the teamed low trusters would theoretically attempt 
to compensate, so an incentive would provide only diminished gains in 
performance). The above interaction was not significant, however.
A main effect of Trust Level was also expected, but it was not 
significant. Trust Level was actually a rather important factor 
within interactions which have already been described.
The prediction that there would be a main effect of work condition 
was not supported as far as the dependent measure is concerned, but 
there is ample indication that work condition did play an important 
role within the study. The previously described simple effect of 
Work Condition for high trust females certainly suggests that work
condition was a factor as far as female behavior is concerned. The
high trust females actually performed just as all high trusters had 
been expected to perform. Work condition also had an effect upon the 
mood levels, for the team condition was more satisfying. The team 
participants (M=3.13) reported that they were not only more thrilled 
than the individuals (M=1.95), F(l,63)=7.43, p<.01, but they as team 
participants (M=5.05) also reported that they took more pride in their 
performance than individuals (M=3.49), F(l,62)=5.47, p<.05.
It was also found that Trial interacted with Gender. The Gender X 
Trial interaction, F(2,128)=4.12, p<.05, is shown in Figure 2. Still
22
further analysis revealed a significant simple effect of Trial for 
males, F(2,64)=10.21, p<.001, which (in the present circumstances) 
indicates that male showed a significant level of improvement over the 
course of the experiment. There was no simple effect for females.
A main effect of Trial, F(2,128)=4.84, p<.01, was also found.
This main effect did, of course, occur within the context of the 
Gender x Trial interaction. Figure 3 shows that there was a general 
trend of improvement which must have been at least partly the result 
of male improvement. As previously mentioned, trial was included as 
an independent variable so that any motivational losses or gains might
be identified.
It was predicted that there would be a main effect of incentive 
upon task performance, but none was found. It is quite possible that 
the effect was overshadowed by the effects of other factors such as 
trust level and/or work condition. What was encouraging is that there 
was a significant difference in the self-reported mood levels of 
participants: Those participating in the incentive condition reported 
that they were more disappointed (M=3.63) with their performance than 
those in the no-incentive condition (M=1.70), F( 1,64)=14.99, p<.001. 
Those participating in the incentive condition also reported higher 
levels of frustration (M=3.78) than those who received no incentive 
(M=2.15), F(l,64)=10.06, p<.01. Incentive did play at least a minor 
role in the study based upon the above.
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Figure 2
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Levels of 
Gender and Trial
24
Figure 3
Mean Number of Locations Circled as a Function of Trial
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Previous research on social compensation has suggested that low 
trusters will perform best in teams while high trusters will perform 
best as individuals: In the present study, low trust males responded 
to the experimental conditions much differently than the low trust 
females (the interaction between Trust Level and Work Condition for 
females was one result). The simple Gender X Work Condition 
interaction for high trusters also indicates that the high trust males 
behaved contrary to expectation. The males, who had been expected to 
engage in social loafing, actually performed best in the team 
condition. Previous research in social compensation and social 
loafing has provided no indication that gender plays a vital role, so 
it was quite surprising to find that gender interacted as it did.
Gender obviously played an important role in the present study, so 
one possible explanation for this will be advanced: A review of the 
research on gender differences acquainted the investigator with a set 
of theories which mesh quite well with the present findings. It is 
Alice Eagly's (1987) suggestion that one of the primary differences
between male and female social behavior is that male behavior is more
task oriented while female behavior is more social-emotional directed.
The result of this difference would be that females tend to devote
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more attention to social behavior while males devote more attention
to the task. Those who seek to maintain a group would supposedly 
attempt to promote social interaction and devote a little less 
attention to the task. In the present study, the males (who devote 
more attention to the way in which the task is being accomplished, 
according to Eagly, 1987) exhibited a great deal of improvement in 
all conditions. Females, on the other hand, actually failed to 
achieve their practice level performance when participating in teams. 
It is quite possible, given the above, that males were devoting their 
complete attention to the task while the females (particularly the 
high trusters) were placing their focus on what kind of person they 
had supposedly been teamed with (as opposed to being concerned with 
how well their teams were performing the task). Such would be the
case if females were more attentive to the social behavior of their
partner. Still another possibility is that the males may have been 
taking a more personal interest in the task. Greater devotion to the 
task would seemingly promote not only personal interest, but also task 
identity (the extent to which participants judge themselves based upon 
how well they performed the task). Regardless of the explanation, 
males appeared to compensate for their partners in every condition, 
while only the low trust females displayed compensation of any kind. 
The high trust females actually loafed on trials 1 and 2.
One will recall that people have displayed a tendency to engage in 
social compensation when they judge their partners to be incapable, so 
it is rather important to mention at this point that team participants
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were told that they and their fictitious partners had set their own 
performance standards during practice. It should be safe to assume, 
therefore, that partners were considered to be capable. Some of the 
various comments heard when feedback was first provided supports this 
assumption quite well, for some were actually accusing their partners 
of "slacking off". Based upon the above, it is extremely unlikely 
that participants judged their partners to be incapable, thus any 
social compensation that occurred is more likely the result of other 
factors (like low trust level).
The prediction that low trusters working within a team would 
outperform all others was supported to some extent by the significant 
simple interaction of Trust Level and Gender for team participants.
As previously noted, low trusters who participated in the team 
condition showed a great deal more improvement than the group of high 
trusters participating in the same conditions. It is suggested here 
that the low trusters (particularly females) were engaging in 
social compensation (as predicted) and that their higher level of 
improvement was a direct result of their social compensation.
While it was predicted that there would be several main effects, 
the only significant main effect was that of Trial. One principal 
reason for this lack of main effects may be that participants did not 
engage in the amount of social loafing observed in Kerr (1983): It 
would appear that participants accepted their performance standards 
(their goal was to exceed practice performance) as realistic goals, 
even though their performance was not described in concrete terms
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(they were not told how many unique locations they had circled). The 
above suggestion is supported by the fact that participants did not 
complain or mention any reservations when they were asked to improve 
upon their practice level performance. It is quite possible that some 
main effects were simply overshadowed by other effects, for the data 
derived from the follow-up questionnaire provide indication that both 
work condition and incentive level did affect the participants’ mood
levels.
One will recall that the reduction of social loafing may be 
achieved by providing individual feedback and objective standards, but 
there was some question about how specific the feedback and standards 
must be. Based upon present findings, it would appear that the 
claimed use of such standards and the provision of only general 
feedback will also prevent or deter social loafing to some extent.
The effects of other factors related to social loafing would naturally
be diminished.
The present study provides some support for Williams and Karau’s 
theory that trust level mediates the amount of social compensation 
exhibited within a group (at least for females). It also supports
their conclusion that trust level and work condition will interact.
As previously mentioned, the incentive used in this study was 
specifically chosen because it would theoretically have greater 
influence than Kerr’s 25 cent reward (Williams and Karau suggested 
that Kerr’s reward had very little impact). The follow-up mood 
inventory certainly indicates that the incentive had an effect upon
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participants. It was, therefore, interesting to find that a high 
trust females did not show significant improvement even when the 
incentive was provided. The urge to engage in social loafing may 
have been one reason for this trend. It would appear, based upon 
the above, that the mere presence of a reward will not prevent social 
loafing.
Conclusions
The results of the present study provide rather strong evidence 
that social compensation takes place. It particularly supports the 
findings of Williams and Karau (1991), at least as far as female 
behavior is concerned. It further indicates that males may be more 
apt to engage in social compensation, perhaps because males are more 
task-oriented in general.
The data provides only weak support for other social loafing 
research, for it appeared that only females engaged in such behavior 
(low trust females performed much better than high trust females in 
the team condition). It is quite possible that the males may have 
been placing so much attention on the task that they were not inclined 
to loaf. The different ways in which the genders responded to the 
various conditions provides strong indication of gender differences.
Generalization of findings such as those previously described 
would prove to be rather difficult due to the fact that one would 
need to have some information about interpersonal trust levels, but
if one did, anyone with the capacity to reward behavior would be
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better equipped to decide which type of reinforcement would be most 
appropriate under each different set of circumstances. Further 
research would certainly be beneficial.
Future Directions
Of all directions that follow-up research might take, one of the 
more interesting might involve exploration of why gender interacted 
as it did. The theory that behavior was influenced by sex differences 
(Eagly, 1987) appears to be quite viable under the circumstances.
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APPENDIX A
Follow-up Questionnaire
1. Did any part of this experiment cause you to feel uncomfortable? 
Yes /No. If ”yes”, please indicate why you felt uncomfortable
2. Can you recall what the outcome of each trial has been? Please 
indicate how your team has done.
Trial 1: failed / succeeded Trial 2: failed / succeeded
3. Was it enjoyable to work with a partner on this task? Yes / No. 
If "no", why not?
4. Now that you have completed two trials, please use the following
set of scales to indicate how you feel. Circle a number on each
HAPPY
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5
ANGRY
6 7 8 9 10 very
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
SATISFIED
7 8 9 10 very
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very
DISAPPOINTED
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
CALM
7 8 9 10 very
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
EXCITED
7 8 9 10 very
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
FRUSTRATED
7 8 9 10 very
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
EMBARRASSED
7 8 9 10 very
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
PROUD
7 8 9 10 very
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
ASHAMED
7 8 9 10 very
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
THRILLED
7 8 9 10 very
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 very
Signature
APPENDIX B
Debriefing Statement 
Experimenter: Steve Bems
The experiment you have just participated in was designed to 
examine factors thought to be associated with social loafing and 
social compensation. Social loafing is what occurs when group 
members allow others to do most of the work on a task even when 
they are capable of contributing an equal share of the work.
Social compensation is what occurs when group members fear that 
others will not contribute their fair share to a group task: 
Compensators try to ensure that a task will get done by working 
even harder (to compensate for the lower productivity of free 
riders). Participants were either asked to work by themselves or 
with fictitious partners so that the effects of these social 
phenomena might be examined. All partners were fictitious because 
it was important to examine how participants would react to someone 
who continuously loafs or free-rides.
It has been hypothesized that social loafing occurs less and that 
social compensation occurs more as a task becomes more important:
The experimental task was made more important in the present study by 
telling half of the participants that better performers would stand a 
better chance of winning $20. In actuality, all participants will 
have the same chances of winning the single $20 prize (this includes 
those who did not know that a prize existed).
It has also been hypothesized that trust level is associated with 
one’s tendency to engage in social compensation, so trust level was 
passively manipulated. Low trusters, in particular, are expected to 
engage in social compensation.
It has already been noted that individual participants were 
included in the present study. Still another control procedure was 
to give all participants the same feedback in each trial. Feedback 
could not be allowed to vary freely for each person, so a small amount 
of deception was necessary. Regardless of actual performance, all 
participants were told that they had succeeded on trials 1 and failed 
on trial 2.
Deception was a necessary part of this study because there was no 
other means to create the same experimental conditions. It is very 
important that you, as a participant and psychologist alike, under­
stand that deception is only used when negative effects are extremely 
unlikely, when the methodology has been approved by an ethics 
committee, and when no other means exist. Consideration of34
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participants is mandatory, in other words.
This type of research can be used to help managers decide which
type of reinforcement should be used in a given setting. When the 
proper method of reinforcement is employed, work groups encounter 
fewer internal conflicts and devote more attention to the task at 
hand. Group managers who know how the above factors interact would 
also seem to be better equipped to resolve conflicts which occur 
within work groups: Conflicts may even be prevented if a worker's 
personal contributions are either recognized or rewarded.
APPENDIX C
Informed Consent Form
I, the undersigned, understand that I am free to quit this 
experiment at any time. I understand that I can receive full 
participation credit if I do choose to quit. I also understand 
that all information and responses I provide will be treated 
confidentially.
In this study on time pressure, I/a partner and I will be 
asked to find a word which appears on a page of scrambled letters 
many times. The task I/my partner and I work on will involve 
finding a word circling it, and re-attempting to find it in other 
positions on copies of the same page. I realize that the purpose 
of this study will not be completely explained until the end of 
this session. I also understand that this session will take 
approximately 45 minutes.
Signature
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APPENDIX D
SAMPLE TASK FORM
HORN
EGYHNUJMEDCHORNTGS 
KQAZWSXEDCRFVFEQWR 
DXETYHNGFSAXCBNROH 
HORNOGCDSVHIYRHUKP 
TWARRXDTYGOBJIOKHG 
UTNVROCGKURJYTREFO 
UYGFVPHLGQCAZWSXED 
KOLNROHYTFVHNKMJND 
UHFKRJKOGCUHBYGVRL 
BODCDXSZRDTFYGHORN 
GRFPHORNBNJBYTGNSA 
BNLHBHWNROHVTFCRDX 
IHGTEBXKDOYJFKCOML 
BYOGFYHRXUGNLMYHBT 
YDHRJHORNKRFTGRDNR 
GCOHNKRJTOOYHORNLI 
ASKJDFJIHLGTRMVDCR 
HORNIYRVDCROYNUMIK 
JUGQYKNROHHRBJPUBY 
NJQAZWSXEDCOHIHORN 
UTGBRFVEDCKLRUIYTW 
IRFBQOHORNUWBCFPJN 
YGUYTVDCSXLI JNUHBY 
YGRFEDCYOBINOMVTHO 
YGVCRFNROHYHNROH IT 
ZTGTFCUHBI JNOKMPBV 
ITGCFPAOSIDUFRMNRO 
GHNVUTFEPKNUHGTFDJ 
NROHPUHGTFRCFBNROH 
LNIYHGVUHBOKNPKJUT 
FCHTFRDFINROHYHUGY
XWEDCRFVTGBYHNUJM 
YIHWQAZADGJOVSWCG 
WHSGJITHQSRVWTNUK 
OOLYEJTEONXLJMDWQ 
TRFCHORNTRCLOYGMB 
KNI JBUGCTFNUYHORN 
CMJUFNBTRFVYGTFKR 
HKPNBHLUPYTNROHBO 
OVCRZKOHFSPIJHPJH 
RPKOJFYRLHNGFVBNF 
NLJBTOKFNPOGIYTRK 
PLKIHVYGCMHRLOUOH 
JGDAOOTUNROHNLJHT 
HCPLRURNVTRFDHORN 
OHGYNTRMRVNBYWPKR 
RKBUTGKBVFOPKLBJO 
PKTSVJYQNJZFIHTGH 
PKIHYFNROHJTFOEQZ 
VTCOKHOJLKOIYRGVF 
KHTRFOVCDSKRLNROH 
ROJKIRJHHFTEQKRUH 
ROHDCXPOZMNROHBOQ 
NVHKTFCRDXESWARQH 
RNJOGYFNGRCTINQTF 
OQFDCXSJRHVHNHVGC 
HBVYHORNIOJBOPTCQ 
HPEQPMUNTRECQRPGR 
BKMIYPTRBNQSPBNHB 
KIYHGBFCVDXJNOIUH 
FGHJNROHIYTGHKJHT 
GTRFGHJKLMIYGBFVD37
APPENDIX E
ANCOVA SUMMARY TABLE (BETWEEN SUBJECTS)
Effect DF F Sig of ]
Within Cells 63
WC 1 .96 .330
TL 1 2.47 .121
Inc 1 .00 .985
Gdr 1 .08 .775
WC x TL 1 1.67 .200
WC x Inc 1 1.91 .172
WC x Gdr 1 1.19 .280
TL x Inc 1 .02 .902
TL x Gdr 1 .55 .461
Inc x Gdr 1 .76 .385
WC x TL x Inc 1 1.61 .210
WC x TL x Gdr 1 9.32 .003
WC x Inc x Gdr 1 3.56 .064
TL x Inc x Gdr 1 1.73 .193
WC x TL x Inc x Gdr 1 .06 .806
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4APPENDIX F
ANCOVA SUMMARY TABLE (WITHIN SUBJECTS)
Effect DF F Siq of F '
Within Cells 128
T 2 4.84 .009
WC x T 2 .58 .564
TL x T 2 2.89 .059
Inc x T 2 .10 .902
Gdr x T 2 4.12 .018
WC x TL x T 2 .14 .870
WC x Inc x T 2 .57 .569
WC x Gdr x T 2 .32 .725
TL x Inc x T 2 .15 .862
TL x Inc x T 2 .04 .961
Inc x Gdr x T 2 .45 .638
WC x TL x Inc x T 2 ' 1.30 .275
WC x TL x Gdr x T 2 .26 .770
WC x Inc x Gdr x T 2 .17 .842
TL x Inc x Gdr x T 2 .72 .488
WC x TL x Inc x Gdr x T 2 1.93 .150
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